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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decade in the United States, network neutrality has evolved from 
a primarily technical concern to a national debate about the future of American 
communications regulation, as well as technology and innovation policy in general. 
In October 2009, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a 
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to codify six principles of network 
neutrality.1 This proceeding, which is unlikely to be completed before mid-2010, 
could have profound economic consequences for consumers, content and 
applications providers, and network operators.  
Network neutrality is a shorthand for a series of policy prescriptions that would 
restrict the ability of broadband Internet service providers (ISPs) to manage 
network traffic. These restrictions include barring network operators from charging 
content and applications providers (as opposed to end users) for entering into 
business-to-business transactions for quality-of-service (QoS) enhancements for 
packet delivery. Although the initial objective for advocates of network neutrality 
regulation was to secure regulation of wireline networks, the debate has expanded 
since its inception to include wireless networks. 
 
                                                 
 Chairman, Criterion Economics, L.L.C.; Ronald Coase Professor of Law and Economics, 
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University, The Netherlands; President, The Coase 
Foundation for Law & Economics, Washington, D.C. E-mail: jgsidak@criterioneconomics.com. This paper 
draws from J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Innovation Spillovers and the “Dirt Road” Fallacy: The 
Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery over the Internet, 6 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2010). I thank Telecom New Zealand for financial support. 
However, the views expressed here are my own. 
1. Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
GN Dkt. No. 09-191, WC Dkt. No. 07-52, ¶¶ 60-80 (2009) [hereinafter Network Neutrality NPRM]. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING NETWORK 
NEUTRALITY REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The new battle in American telecommunications regulation—said by some to 
decide the future of the Internet—centers on an arcane notion dubbed “network 
neutrality.” Based on theories that innovation in Internet content and applications is 
threatened by ISPs’ network management practices, proponents of network 
neutrality have called for the implementation of network neutrality regulations that 
would ban network operators from blocking certain content and from charging 
content and applications providers for prioritized delivery over their networks. The 
issue has sparked a decade-long debate involving top industry players and scholars 
in law and economics. The FCC has responded by issuing a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking that would codify its four Internet Policy Principles along with an 
added proposed “nondiscrimination” rule, which would ban business-to-business 
transactions for QoS between network operators and content and applications 
providers, and a transparency rule. The FCC’s proposed “nondiscrimination” rule 
has become the center of the network neutrality debate in the United States. 
According to the FCC, the proposed rule is part of an effort to keep the Internet 
open.  
 
A. The Rise of Network Neutrality 
 
“The Internet revolution has ended just as surprisingly as it began. None 
expected the explosion of creativity that the network produced; few expected that 
explosion to collapse as quickly and profoundly as it has.”2 Lawrence Lessig’s 
assessment in November 2001 was perhaps the first marker in the network 
neutrality movement. Much has been said about network neutrality since creativity 
supposedly died in 2001. The early work by those advocating network neutrality 
regulation—primarily Lessig3 and Tim Wu4—posited dire outcomes for the future 
of the Internet. Mainly, early proponents of network neutrality regulation have 
claimed that, without network neutrality policies restricting the network 
management and business practices of network operators, innovation in Internet 
content and applications would be choked off. This argument is sometimes 
presented in terms of: Will there be “the next Google” if there is not network 
neutrality regulation imposed to preserve the Internet as the open platform that 
network neutrality proponents say that it has been for several decades?  
To address those theorized harms, proponents of network neutrality have 
sought to implement rules that would prohibit (1) blockage of content or 
applications over a network and (2) business-to-business transactions for enhanced 
QoS—or prioritized delivery—between network operators and content and 
 
2. Lawrence Lessig, The Internet Under Siege, 127 FOREIGN POL’Y 56, 56 (2001).  
3. See id; LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (Random House 2001) [hereinafter LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS]; Lawrence 
Lessig, Congress Must Keep Broadband Competition Alive, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006; Lawrence Lessig & 
Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A23; Net Neutrality, 
Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (2006) 
(testimony of Lawrence Lessig, C. Wendell & Edith M. Carlsmith), available at 
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/Lessig_Testimony_2.pdf [hereinafter Lessig Testimony on Net 
Neutrality]. 
4. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
141 (2003). 
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applications providers. Currently, Internet networks use packet technology under a 
“best-effort” delivery standard. “Quality of service” is the phrase that is used to 
describe something superior to best-effort delivery of packets. The proposed ban 
on business-to-business transactions for QoS would prohibit the telephone or cable 
company from directly contracting with the provider of content or applications for 
speedier delivery of its content on the local access network. This ban boils down to 
a ban on charging different prices that reflect different levels of QoS. 
Although proponents of network neutrality have cast network neutrality as a 
means to preserve creativity, innovation, and the openness of the Internet, network 
neutrality relates to the technical question of how to address network congestion. 
Electronic communications are converging onto a single platform, the Internet 
Protocol (IP) platform. In their seminal 1974 paper, Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn 
presented a protocol design that would evolve into the now ubiquitous TCP/IP.5 
Convergence to the IP platform is beneficial in several ways. The IP platform 
allows heterogeneous content to travel across a common architecture. Unlike 
circuit-switched networks, the IP platform sends information in packets—thus, an 
IP network is a packet-switched network. The transportation of data in packets 
entails that, rather than needing to remain open for one stream of data for the entire 
duration of the data transmission, a given portion of bandwidth can accommodate 
numerous streams of data simultaneously. 
At the same time, this convergence to IP makes combating congestion and 
maintaining efficient Internet traffic flows much more challenging. Different 
content and applications have different QoS needs. For example, real-time content 
is far less tolerant of latency or jitter than email is. Increasingly diverse traffic is 
intermingled in broadband Internet networks, and the sharing of infrastructure 
means that congestion created by one type of traffic can impair the QoS of other 
traffic. 
The question is how best to address those challenges. Network operators have 
long used packet prioritization mechanisms to manage the traffic flow of data 
packets over their networks.6 Nonetheless, some proponents of network neutrality 
regulation would ban packet prioritization altogether, claiming that the 
prioritization of one packet of information over another in the context of a capacity 
constraint is a “zero-sum” game. Google makes this argument in comments that it 
filed with the FCC in January 2010.7 This argument asserts simplistically—and 
incorrectly—that prioritizing one packet necessarily degrades another. 
Consequently, it is argued, there is no net gain in social welfare. 
Other proponents of network neutrality regulation would ban network 
operators from charging content and applications providers for prioritized delivery. 
Although such supporters of network neutrality regulation acknowledge the 
benefits of packet prioritization and support only a ban on charging content and 
applications providers for enhanced delivery, they ignore that the most efficient 
 
5. Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication, 22 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637 (1974).  
6. One example of enhanced end-to-end delivery is virtual private networks (VPN) service, which 
businesses commonly use to enable employees to connect to the enterprise’s network from offsite. See, e.g., 
Connect:Direct® Over a VPN Connection, http://www22.verizon.com/wholesale/lsp/connguide/1,5133,4-
East-Billing-dialup,00.html; AT&T Virtual Private Networks, 
http://www.business.att.com/enterprise/Portfolio/vpn-services-enterprise/. 
7. Comments of Google Inc., In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry 
Practices, GN Dkt. No. 09-191, WC Dkt. No. 07-52, at 35 (filed with the FCC Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 
Google Comments]. 
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way to determine which packets should receive priority in congestion situations 
(and how much) is to allow network operators to elicit such information in market 
transactions by offering paid prioritization to those content and applications 
providers that value it. In market settings, the most efficient means of 
communicating information is through price signals.8 Nonetheless, proponents of 
such a ban have discounted the benefits of differential pricing and focused on 
theories of harm, explained in detail below, frequently used to attempt to justify a 
ban on optional business-to-business transactions for QoS. 
 
B.  The Economic Debate Over Network Neutrality Regulation 
 
The work by law professors Lessig, Wu, Barbara van Schewick,9 and other 
proponents of network neutrality regulation propounded several key assumptions 
or theories about network neutrality to justify proposed prohibitions on network 
operators’ network management and business practices. First was the assumption 
that monopoly power exists in broadband Internet access service. Early arguments 
in favor of network neutrality regulation have relied on the assumption of 
monopoly power to conclude that network operators have the incentive and ability 
to discriminate against competing content and applications by blocking content or 
imposing high prioritization fees that discourage content and applications providers 
from developing new products. 
A second assumption of the early proponents of network neutrality regulation 
was the normative judgment that innovation “at the edges” of the network is more 
virtuous than innovation within the core of the network. This assumption led 
proponents to reason that regulation was justified at any cost to promote innovation 
at the edges. 
Third, the early proponents of network neutrality regulation suggest that the 
use of optional business-to-business transactions for QoS could lead to 
anticompetitive discrimination, or that network operators would use the threat of 
degraded best-effort service quality to force content and applications providers to 
pay for enhanced priority services. A common variant of this argument is the so-
called “dirt road” metaphor, coined by Lessig and a co-author. Lessig claimed that 
the broadband ISP would “force” content and applications providers to purchase 
enhanced QoS delivery by threatening to intentionally degrade the delivery of their 
packets if they did not do so, effectively relegating them to an Internet “slow lane,” 
which would be the equivalent of a winding “dirt road.”10 Although offering 
content providers QoS enhancement for a fee is not necessarily “discriminatory” in 
any economically meaningful sense of the term—just as it is not discriminatory for 
Honda to charge more for an Accord than a Civic—the ability of network operators 
and suppliers of content or applications to enter into voluntary QoS transactions 
emerged as a central issue in the debate over network neutrality regulation. 
The economic rebuttal to the theories of harm posited by early proponents of 
network neutrality since 2003 has been rigorous. The first extended legal or 
economic critiques of proposals for network neutrality regulation appeared in 2005 
 
8. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).  
9. See Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality 
Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329 (2007). 
10. Lessig & McChesney, supra note 3, at A23. 
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and 2006 in congressional testimony and academic articles by Christopher Yoo11 
and Gregory Sidak.12 “The problem,” Yoo contended, “is that—as even network 
neutrality proponents concede—deviations from network neutrality may well be 
motivated by legitimate concerns about network management and that it can be 
difficult, if not impossible for experts to predict which architectural approach will 
eventually prevail.”13 Sidak observed that network neutrality regulation would 
harm social welfare by slowing broadband adoption and innovation.14 Of particular 
relevance to the current debate on optional business-to-business QoS transactions, 
he stressed that, at its foundation, “the debate over network neutrality is essentially 
a debate over how best to finance the construction and maintenance of a broadband 
network in a two-sided market in which senders and receivers have additive 
demand for the delivery of a given piece of information—and hence additive 
willingness to pay.”15 Sidak criticized the proponents of network neutrality 
regulation for ignoring the consequences for consumers if regulation were 
imposed.16 
Scholarly opposition to network neutrality regulation has grown quickly. There 
is now a robust body of literature that considers network neutrality regulation with 
respect to its effect on investment and innovation, competition, speech and civic 
participation, and congestion management. Leading economists, technologists, and 
legal scholars who have considered this issue include William Baumol,17 Gary 
Becker,18 Dennis Carlton,19 Richard Epstein,20 David Farber,21 Gerald 
 
11. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005); Christopher 
S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 95 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006). 
12. See J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the 
Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349, 349 (2006), available at 
http://www.criterioneconomics.com/pdfs/A_Consumer_Welfare_Approach_to_Network_Neutrality_Regul
ation_of_the_Internet.pdf; Net Neutrality, Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & 
Transportation, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (2006) (testimony of J. Gregory Sidak) [hereinafter Sidak 2006 
Senate Testimony] (listing six essential characteristics of communications networks that rendered regulation 
unnecessary and likely harmful to investment and innovation incentives among network operators: the 
substantial sunk investments required to build networks, economies of scale, economies of scope, 
differential pricing, two-sided demand, and the susceptibility of networks to congestion); see also J. 
Gregory Sidak, Consumer Welfare and Network Neutrality, Presentation at the Federal Trade Commission 
Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy Workshop (Feb. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/broadband/presentations/sidak.pdf (cited in FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY (June 2007), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf. 
13. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, supra note 11, at 1851. 
14. Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, supra 
note 12. 
15. Id. at 350.  
16. Id. at 474 (“It bears repeating that the stakeholders whose interests should weigh most heavily 
in the deliberations of policy makers are consumers, not any particular constituency of competitors.”).  
17. See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Martin Cave, Peter Cramton, Robert Hahn, Thomas W. Hazlett, 
Paul L. Joskow, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert Litan, John Mayo, Patrick A. Messerlin, Bruce M. Owen, Robert S. 
Pindyck, Scott J. Savage, Vernon L. Smith, Scott Wallsten, Leonard Waverman & Lawrence J. White, 
Economists’ Statement on Network Neutrality Policy (AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 
RP07-08, Mar. 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976889#PaperDownload (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) 
[hereinafter Economists’ Statement]. 
18.  See Declaration of Gary S. Becker & Dennis W. Carlton, In the Matter of Preserving the Open 
Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, GN Dkt. No. 09-191, WC Dkt. No. 07-52 (filed with the FCC on 
behalf of Verizon Jan. 14, 2010). 
19. See id. 
20. See Richard A. Epstein, Net Neutrality at the Crossroads, FT.COM, Oct. 27, 2009, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d9611768-c310-11de-8eca-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1. 
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Faulhaber,22 Thomas Hazlett,23 Scott Hemphill,24 Paul Joskow,25 Alfred Kahn,26 
Robert Kahn,27 Michael Katz,28 Bruce Owen,29 Robert Pindyck,30 Gregory 
Rosston,31 Richard Schmalensee,32 Marius Schwartz,33 Vernon Smith,34 Daniel 
Spulber,35 and Leonard Waverman.36 These scholars have demonstrated that 
arguments in favor of network neutrality regulation lack empirical support; fail to 
account for the impacts of customer choice, two-sided markets, competition, and 
innovation; rest on a misguided focus on only one component of social welfare—
content provider welfare—rather than total welfare; and disregard the obvious 
costs of regulation, in the form of social welfare losses resulting from reduced 
investment and innovation by both network operators and content and applications 
providers, reduced product differentiation, and higher end-user pr
 
21.  See Gerald Faulhaber & David J. Farber, The Open Internet: A Consumer-Centric Framework, 
GN Dkt. 09-191, WC Dkt. 07-52 (filed with the FCC on behalf of AT&T Jan. 14, 2010); David Farber & 
Michael Katz, Hold Off on Net Neutrality, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2007, at A19. 
22. See Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 21.  
23. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Broadbandits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2006, at A9, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115533922506533851-search.html. 
24.  See C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 
YALE J. ON REG. 135 (2008). 
25. Economists’ Statement, supra note 17. 
26.  See Alfred E. Kahn, Statement of Alfred E. Kahn, Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Political 
Economy, Emeritus, Cornell University, before the FTC Workshop on Broadband Connectivity 
Competition Policy, (delivered Feb. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/broadband/presentations/kahn.pdf (Feb. 21, 2007 rev.) (last visited May 
11, 2010). 
27. See Robert Kahn, Remarks at An Evening with Robert Kahn in Conversation with Ed 
Feigenbaum, Computer History Museum (Jan. 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.computerhistory.org/events/index.php?id=1162920599 (last visited May 11, 2010); see also 
Andrew Orlowski, Father of the Internet Warns Against Net Neutrality, THE REGISTER, Jan. 18, 2007, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/18/kahn_net_neutrality_warning/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) 
(“Robert Kahn, the most senior figure in the development of the internet, has delivered a strong warning 
against ‘Net Neutrality’ legislation.”).  
28.  See Michael L. Katz, Maximizing Consumer Benefits from Broadband, GN Dkt. No. 09-191, 
WC Dkt. No. 07-52 (filed with the FCC on behalf of Verizon Jan. 14, 2010); Farber & Katz, supra note 21. 
29. See Bruce M. Owen, Antecedents to Net Neutrality, 30 REG. 14 (2007); Bruce M. Owen & 
Gregory L. Rosston, Local Broadband Access: Primum Non Nocere or Primum Processi? A Property 
Rights Approach, in NET NEUTRALITY OR NET NEUTERING: SHOULD BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE 
REGULATED? 163 (Thomas M. Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2006). 
30. Economists’ Statement, supra note 17. 
31. See Gregory L. Rosston & Michael D. Topper, An Antitrust Analysis of the Case for Wireless 
Network Neutrality (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 08-040, July 2009); 
Owen & Rosston, supra note 29. 
32. Economists’ Statement, supra note 17. 
33. See Declaration of Marius Schwartz, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband 
Industry Practices, GN Dkt. No. 09-191, WC Dkt. No. 07-52 (filed with the FCC on behalf of AT&T Jan. 
14, 2010) [hereinafter Schwartz Declaration]. 
34. Economists’ Statement, supra note 17. 
35.  See DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: 
ECONOMICS AND LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). 
36.  See Leonard Waverman, Comments on Network Neutrality, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON 475 
(2006). This list is only partial. See, e.g., Michael D. Topper, Broadband Competition and Network 
Neutrality Regulation, GN Dkt. No. 09-191, WC Dkt. No. 07-52 (filed with the FCC on behalf of Verizon 
Jan. 14, 2010); Gerald Faulhaber, David Farber, Michael Katz & Christopher Yoo, Common Sense on Net 
Neutrality (2006) available at http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-
people/200606/msg00014.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010); William E. Kennard, Spreading the Broadband 
Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at A13; Robert Pepper, Net Neutrality Debate Sets Out a False 
Choice, NETWORK WORLD, June 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2006/061206-net-neutrality-no.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
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Lessig and Wu, in particular, have been criticized for failing to explain why 
their theorized outcomes are likely to occur under real-world conditions, or how 
they are consistent with settled economic understandings of the remarkably 
dynamic markets that had produced the Internet. Lessig and Wu, among the other 
early proponents of network neutrality regulation, have not provided empirical 
evidence to support claims that monopoly power exists in broadband markets, a 
key assumption on which their theories of harm hinge. Further, they failed to 
demonstrate how network neutrality regulation would remedy those theorized 
harms.   
Scholars note that preemptive regulation is unjustified because there is no 
market failure in the provision of broadband access.37 They have presented 
empirical evidence that the market for broadband access is competitive.38 They 
reject the FCC’s proposed regulation of wireless networks, as the wireless industry 
is both demonstrably competitive and subject to spectrum constraints.39 
Additionally, opponents of network neutrality regulation observe that antitrust law 
is sufficient to remedy any anticompetitive behavior that might arise.40 
 
C.  The Progression of the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
 
The progression of FCC policy that led up to the FCC’s issuance of the Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet and 
Broadband Industry Practices,41 began, effectively, on September 23, 2005, when 
the FCC released a Policy Statement containing four principles (the Internet Policy 
Principles).42 In explaining its purpose in adopting the four principles, the FCC 
cited the national Internet policy that Congress established in its revision of the 
Communications Act of 1934: 
 
Congress states that it is the policy of the United States to “preserve the vibrant 
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet” and “to 
promote the continued development of the Internet.” In section 706(a) of the 
[Communications Act], Congress charges the Commission with “encourage[ing] 
the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced 
telecommunications capability”—broadband—“to all Americans.”43 
 
 
37. Faulhaber and Farber observe that, “during ten years of experience without network neutrality 
regulations, there are just two incidents (the tiresomely familiar Madison River and Comcast cases) of any 
actual misbehavior by broadband ISPs.” Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 21, at 1. 
38. Topper, supra note 36, at 5; Schwartz Declaration, supra note 33, at 31-34; Becker & Carlton, 
supra note 17, at 7. 
39. Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 21, at 31; see also Jeffrey H. Reed & Nishith D. Tripathi, The 
Application of Network Neutrality Regulations to Wireless Systems: A Mission Infeasible, GN Dkt. No. 09-
191, WC Dkt. No. 07-52, at 5 (filed with the FCC on behalf of AT&T, Jan. 14, 2010). 
40. See, e.g., Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 21, at 33; Katz, supra note 28, at 5. 
41. Net Neutrality NPRM, supra note 1. 
42. In the Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications 
Services, Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced 
Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and 
Requirements, Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 
Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the 
Internet Over Cable Facilities, Policy Statement, CC Dkt. No. 02-33, 01-337, 95-20, 98-10, GN Dkt. No. 
00-185, CS Dkt. No. 02-52, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986 ¶ 4 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy Statement].  
43. Id. ¶ 2 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1); 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (3); 47 U.S.C. § 157 nt. (incorporating 
section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996))).  
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To be “consistent with these Congressional directives,”44 the FCC sought to 
establish policies that would “ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, 
open, affordable, and accessible to all consumers.”45 Thus the FCC adopted the 
Internet Policy Principles, which are as follows: 
 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the Internet, consumers are entitled to the lawful 
Internet content of their choice. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the Internet, consumers are entitled to run 
applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law 
enforcement. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the Internet, consumers are entitled to connect their 
choice of legal devices that do not harm the network. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the Internet, consumers are entitled to competition 
among network providers, application and service providers, and content 
providers.46 
 
Although not officially codified as regulations, the FCC’s Internet Policy 
Principles indicated the Commission’s growing concern with preserving the 
potential for innovation that the Internet had offered up to the release of the 
Internet Policy Principles and which some feared would decrease if network 
operators were permitted to prohibit end users from viewing certain content or 
using certain applications, services, or devices.  
The FCC’s investigation into allegations against Madison River 
Communications, LLC in February 2005 likely influenced its decision to adopt the 
four Internet Policy Principles in September 2005.47 Madison River was accused of 
blocking ports used for VoIP applications and therein impeding its customers’ 
ability to use VoIP applications.48 Although the investigation was resolved in 
March 2005 after Madison River agreed to make a payment of $15,000 to the U.S. 
Treasury, the case has been frequently cited among proponents of network 
neutrality regulation as an example of the type of anticompetitive network practices 
that could become prevalent if not limited by ex ante regulation.  
Between the release of its policy statement in 2005 and the release of the 
NPRM in 2009, the FCC addressed only one other case of alleged blocking, when, 
in 2008, it investigated allegations that Comcast was interfering with consumers’ 
use of peer-to-peer Internet applications over its cable network.49 Comcast claimed 
that its conduct was “necessary to ease network congestion,” but the FCC 
 
44. Id.  
45. Id. ¶ 4.  
46. Id (emphasis in original).  
47. In the Matter of Madison River Communications, LLC and Affiliated Companies, Consent 
Decree, File No. EB-05-IH-0110, Acct. No. FRN: 0004334082, 20 FCC Rcd. 4,295, 4,296 ¶ 3.   
48. Id.  
49. In the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast 
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications and Broadband Industry Practices Petition 
of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s 
Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for “Reasonable Network Management”, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, File No. EB-08-IH-1518, WC Dkt. No. 07-52, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028 (Aug. 
20, 2008).    
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disagreed.50 The FCC concluded instead that “the company’s discriminatory and 
arbitrary practice unduly squelches the dynamic benefits of an open and accessible 
Internet and does not constitute reasonable network management.”51 In its 
memorandum and order released on August 20, 2008, the FCC required Comcast 
to disclose its practices to its customers, submit a “compliance plan” describing 
how it would stop those practices, and “disclose to both the Commission and the 
public the details of the network management practices that it intends to deploy 
following termination of its current practices.”52 Similarly to the Madison River 
case, the Comcast decision has been frequently cited by network neutrality 
advocates as evidence of the need for more stringent network neutrality 
regulation.53 
Slightly more than a year after it ruled against Comcast, the FCC released its 
NPRM. In the Notice, the FCC proposed to codify the four existing Internet Policy 
Principles as well as two new principles: a “nondiscrimination” rule and a 
transparency rule that “would require a broadband Internet access service provider 
to disclose such information concerning network management and other practices 
as is reasonably required for users and content, application, and service providers 
to enjoy the protections specified in this rulemaking.”54 The Commission sought 
comment on the proposed codification of these six network neutrality principles as 
well as on the extent to which the principles should be applied to managed or 
specialized services.55 The FCC also sought comment on whether and the extent to 
which the principles should be adopted for “non-wireline forms of Internet access, 
including, but not limited to, terrestrial mobile wireless, unlicensed wireless, 
licensed fixed wireless, and satellite.”56  
The first round of comments on the NPRM was completed as scheduled on 
January 14, 2010. The second round of reply comments was completed on April 
26, 2010, following the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
on April 6, 2010 in Comcast Corp. v. FCC.57 In the decision, the D.C. Circuit 
granted Comcast’s request for review of the FCC’s 2008 order and, upon review, 
vacated it.58 The D.C. Circuit ruled that the FCC has no direct authority over 
Comcast’s network practices and that it had failed to show that “barring Comcast 
from interfering with its customers’ use of peer-to-peer networking applications—
is ‘reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective performance of its statutorily mandated 
responsibilities.’”59 Thus, the D.C. Circuit rejected the claim of “ancillary 
authority” by which the FCC had asserted jurisdiction to regulate Comcast’s traffic 
management practices.  
In response to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the chairman and general counsel of 
the FCC proposed a new legal theory—a “third way”—to justify the Commission’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over broadband access providers’ network management 
 
50. Id. ¶ 1.  
51. Id.  
52. Id.   
53. See, e.g., Google Comments, supra note 7, at 39 (“The FCC already has encountered Internet 
Policy Statement violations in the Comcast-BitTorrent and the Madison River-Vonage cases.” (citations 
omitted)).  
54. NPRM ¶ 16.  
55. Id.  
56. Id.  
57. Id. ¶ 2.  
58. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2010).  
59. Id at 3 (quoting American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
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practices.60 The “third way” would reclassify “the transmission component of 
broadband access service” as a telecommunications service,61 which supposedly 
would give the FCC jurisdiction to regulate broadband ISPs’ network management 
practices under Title II of the Communications Act.62 As of May 11, 2010, the 
FCC has not yet announced whether it will invite a third round of comments in the 
existing docket to examine the “third way” proposal. 
 
D.  The FCC’s Proposed “Nondiscrimination” Rule 
 
 The FCC’s proposed “nondiscrimination” rule banning a charge on enhanced 
QoS is now the center of controversy in the network neutrality debate. The FCC 
has proposed63 that: “Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of 
broadband Internet access service must treat lawful content, applications, and 
services in a nondiscriminatory manner.”64 The FCC would define 
“nondiscriminatory” in this context to be synonymous with “no priority delivery 
fees.” The agency states: “We understand the term ‘nondiscriminatory’ to mean 
that a broadband Internet access service provider may not charge a content, 
application, or service provider for enhanced or prioritized access to the 
subscribers of the broadband Internet access service provider.”65 Curiously, 
denying network operators and businesses supplying content and applications the 
ability to enter into voluntary transactions—unless the transaction occurs at a zero 
price—is the supposed means to achieve “nondiscrimination.”  
In the FCC’s first round of comments filed in the rulemaking proceeding, 
supporters of network neutrality regulation attempted to provide economic support 
for the proposed “nondiscrimination” rule.66 Three such papers are by Nicholas 
Economides,67 Christiaan Hogendorn,68 and Inimai Chettiar and J. Scott 
Holladay.69 Their advocacy has coalesced around three basic theories. The first is 
the theory that, if permitted to charge suppliers of content or applications for 
prioritized delivery, network operators will ignore positive spillover effects produced 
 
60. Press Release, FCC, FCC Releases Chairman Video Address, New Media Resources on Third 
Way Legal Approach (May 7, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
297976A1.pdf (last visited May 11, 2010). 
61. Statement of Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored 
Broadband Framework, at 5 (May 6, 2010), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297944A1.pdf (last visited May 11, 2010). 
62. Id. 
63. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 42, at 986 ¶ 4 (2005). Seeking to “encourage broadband 
deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet,” the FCC 
declared that consumers possess entitlements “to access the lawful Internet content of their choice,” “to run 
applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement,” “to connect their 
choice of legal devices that do not harm the network,” and to benefit from “competition among network 
providers, application and service providers, and content providers.” Id. But see Comcast Corp., No. 08-
1291 (depriving FCC of authority to enforce Internet policy statement). 
64. Network Neutrality NRPM, supra note 1, at 41 ¶ 104. 
65. Id. ¶ 105. 
66. The “nondiscrimination” rule can best be regarded as a “no priority access fee” rule. 
Nevertheless, in what follows, we will use the FCC’s “nondiscrimination” language. 
67. Nicholas Economides, Why Imposing New Tolls on Third-Party Content and Applications 
Threatens Innovation and Will Not Improve Broadband Providers’ Investments, GN Dkt. No. 09-191, WC 
Dkt. No. 07-52 (filed with the FCC on behalf of Google Jan. 14, 2010). 
68. Christiaan Hogendorn, Spillovers and Network Neutrality, GN Dkt. No. 09-191, WC Dkt. No. 
07-52 (filed with the FCC on behalf of Google Jan. 2010). 
69. Inimai M. Chettiar & J. Scott Holladay, Free to Invest, The Economic Benefits of Preserving 
Net Neutrality (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Institute for Policy Integrity, Report No. 4, Jan. 2010).  
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by Internet content and applications and will set prices for priority delivery above 
socially optimal levels, leading to the undersupply of content and applications. The 
second is the theory that vertically integrated network operators will foreclose or 
discriminate against independent providers of Internet content and applications, 
particularly those that compete with the network operator’s own complementary 
service offerings. Economides also echoes a third theory that the broadband Internet 
access provider will intentionally degrade the quality of best-effort delivery of 
Internet packets—transforming, in Lessig’s colorful imagery, the quality of best-
effort delivery to that of a “dirt road”70—as a means of coercing suppliers of 
content or applications into purchasing superior QoS.  
Opponents of the proposed “nondiscrimination” rule posit that those three 
theories of harm lack proper grounding in economic principles and conflict with 
the real-world experience of competition and innovation over the Internet. 
Proponents of network neutrality regulation ignore that spillovers are common in 
competitive markets and that their mere presence does not establish the existence of 
market failure that warrants regulatory intervention. Although proponents of network 
neutrality regulation claim that innovation is threatened by transactions between ISPs 
and content providers for QoS enhancements, it is more plausible that the option of 
purchasing enhanced QoS will promote greater innovation among content and 
applications producers, who will benefit from the assurance that a customer will 
enjoy a more consistent and better experience when accessing their products.71 
Moreover, if the concern underlying the proposed ban on optional business-to-
business QoS transactions is insufficient funding for Internet content and 
applications, there are existing, effective market mechanisms to fund Internet 
content innovation, which obviate government intervention. 
Proponents of the foreclosure theory ignore the reality that many network 
operators are vertically integrated only in very limited respects into content or 
applications production or their substitutes, and thus lack even theoretical incentives 
to foreclose customer-valued content or applications from their networks outside 
those limited areas.   
In response to the “dirt road” theory, opponents of network neutrality regulation 
have indicated that it is not credible that a network operator would intentionally 
degrade its best-effort delivery of packets in hopes of inducing suppliers of content 
and applications to buy prioritized delivery of packets. The empirical evidence 
confirms that broadband ISPs have, in fact, been investing billions of dollars 
annually to increase the speed and improve the quality of best-effort Internet service, 
even while many broadband ISPs also provide prioritized delivery of video and voice 
packets over the same physical infrastructure. The FCC has recently recognized in 
its National Broadband Plan that the substantial investment undertaken by network 
operators has led to 20 percent annual increases in download speeds for the last ten 
years.72 That outcome is exactly what economics would predict under real-world 
conditions of platform competition and complementarity between content availability 
and performance and demand for broadband Internet access services. Put differently, 
there is neither empirical evidence nor support in economic theory that incentives 
for network operators to degrade best-effort traffic exist or are sufficiently strong 
as to outweigh countervailing incentives. 
 
70. See Lessig & McChesney, supra note 3, at A23. 
71.  See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258 
(2007). 
72. See FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 38 (2010). 
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Opponents of network neutrality regulation note that the FCC’s proposed 
“nondiscrimination” rule, in particular, relies on an assumption that traffic is not 
treated differently in the Internet.73 Different applications have different QoS 
requirements, and, in the interest of optimizing traffic, network operators treat—
and have always treated—different types of traffic differently.74 These scholars 
emphasize that network operators must continue to have the flexibility to manage 
traffic on their networks efficiently to ensure a high quality experience for end 
users.75 As Becker and Carlton observe, there is no reason to assume that the FCC 
is better equipped than network operators to determine the optimal business 
practices in response to the demands of rapidly changing technologies and 
consumer tastes.76 Opponents of network neutrality regulation also express concern 
that the FCC misunderstands the likely effects of its proposals on consumer 
welfare. My view is that the proposed “nondiscrimination” regulation is likely to 
make both broadband ISPs and content and application providers—as well as 
consumers—worse off. 
Even scholars who have reserved judgment on the possibility that some 
targeted Internet regulation might be appropriate under some conditions, including 
the FCC’s chief technology officer, have cautioned against sweeping limits on 
optional QoS transactions.77 Indeed, even vocal proponents of network neutrality 
regulation have acknowledged that the optional QoS arrangements that the FCC 
proposes to ban may hold great promise for both content providers and 
consumers.78 For example, in a 2008 hearing before the FCC on network 
neutrality, Lessig testified against a broad ban on QoS tiering, on the grounds that 
zero-price regulation “blocks productive discrimination—discriminations that 
actually help facilitate the spread of broadband and growth without risking a threat 
to network neutralit 79
From an economic perspective, the FCC’s proposed definition of 
“nondiscriminatory” would permit a situation where Company X is supplied one 
level of QoS at a zero price and Company Y is supplied a superior level of QoS at 
the same price—zero. To an economist, it would be discriminatory to charge the 
same price for two products having different levels of performance. Yet, the FCC’s 
zero-price rule for ISP-content provider transactions appears to mandate this result. 
Under the FCC’s zero-price rule vis-à-vis content providers, broadband ISPs would 
be left to recover costs associated with whatever QoS enhancements they would 
 
73. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 28, at 2. 
74. Id. at 8; Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 21, at 17 (citing Roger Bohn, Hans-Werner Braun, 
Kimberly C. Claffy & Stephen Wolff, Mitigating the Coming Internet Crunch: Multiple Service Levels via 
Precedence, 3 J. HIGH SPEED NETWORKS 2 (1994)); SPULBER & YOO, supra note 35, at 405-32. 
75. Becker & Carlton, supra note 17, at 5-6. 
76. Id. at 22.  
77. See, e.g., Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the Quest 
for a Balanced Policy, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 644 (2007); Howard A. Shelanksi, Network Neutrality: Regulating 
with More Questions than Answers, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2007); Joseph Farrell & Phil 
Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust 
and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003). 
78. See, e.g., Robin S. Lee & Tim Wu, Subsidizing Creativity Through Network Design: Zero 
Pricing and Net Neutrality, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 61, 73-74 (2009) (“network management and 
quality of service inherently requires some form of packet discrimination or content co-location, and are 
practices with which we do not necessarily take issue”); Second En Banc Hearing on Broadband Network 
Management Practices before the FCC, Dkt. 07-52 (Apr. 17, 2008) (testimony of Lawrence Lessig), 
available at Testifying @ FCC @ Stanford, Lessig Blog (posted Apr. 18, 2008), 
http://lessig.org/blog/2008/04/testifying_fcc_stanford.html [hereinafter Lessig 2008 FCC Testimony] 
79. Lessig 2008 FCC Testimony, supra note 78, at 2. 
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make solely from end-user consumers, assuming that a consumer-focused 
mechanism for distinguishing between QoS-sensitive and QoS-insensitive traffic 
could even be developed. The reality, of course, is that the proposed zero-price rule 
would likely discourage ISP participation in the optional business-to-business 
market for QoS. 
The nondiscrimination rule is especially puzzling because numerous entities 
already provide Internet-based QoS enhancements for a fee to content providers. 
They include Akamai Technologies, BitGravity, Level 3 Communications, 
Limelight Networks, and other third-party content delivery networks (CDNs). 
CDNs store content and applications in multiple, dispersed servers located 
relatively close to end users, which reduces the latency that end users might 
otherwise experience if the content and applications were stored in a single, 
centrally located server. Thus, although traffic is often handled on a nonprioritized 
best-effort basis between a CDN and an end user, the use of a CDN can 
significantly enhance the service quality experienced by the end user. Moreover, a 
number of large content providers such as Google self-provide QoS-enhancing 
facilities (for example, by locating data centers at various locations around the 
world to reduce the distance that data must travel from its facilities to end-users). 
Firms apparently retain the freedom to negotiate and set the terms of such offerings 
and arrangements. 
 
E.  Politicizing the Debate 
 
 Core to the debate over network neutrality regulation are differing beliefs 
relating to Internet architecture. The conceptual basis for network neutrality derives 
substantially from the “end-to-end” design principles introduced in the 1980s, 
when the Internet was converted from a closed network used solely by academics 
engaged in defense research to one available to the public.80 End-to-end system 
design, whereby “intelligence” is concentrated at the endpoints of the network 
rather than at its core, was originally adopted for flexibility, in the belief that such a 
design would best foster innovation at that time. Since then, although some 
members of the network engineering community have remained dogmatic 
supporters of end-to-end design, many others have reversed their opinions.  
Acknowledging the profound transformation that the Internet has undergone in 
the years since its inception, many former proponents favor a more intelligent 
network core, capable of organizing and prioritizing data packets for optimal 
efficiency. Early Internet applications and content were primitive, compared with 
those that exist today. End-to-end architecture enabled easy experimentation, 
which fostered innovation. However, technological advancement in content and 
applications, contemporaneous with significant hardware innovation, has reduced 
the costs of and increased the demand for Internet access. The result has been a 
large increase in traffic and a greater demand for bandwidth. Recognizing the 
limited capacity of an end-to-end system to handle large and diverse amounts of 
traffic, the network engineering community now regards end-to-end design as 
impractical and inefficient. 
 
80.  Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel 
C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts & Stephen Wolff, A Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society 
(Dec. 10, 2003), available at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
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In contrast, popular arguments for network neutrality regulation continue to 
espouse end-to-end design principles, a problem exacerbated by the fact that the 
current debate is dominated by political interest groups that often lack sufficient 
understanding of network architecture. Politicians and celebrity advocates have 
largely ignored the problems of bandwidth overload; they frame network neutrality 
as a right analogous to freedom of expression, neglecting considerations of 
network constraints in their arguments for neutrality regulation—turning network 
neutrality into an ideology.81 The use of politically charged language in support of 
network neutrality obscures the immediate issue of organizing traffic to maximize 
consumer welfare. Such language may be rhetorically powerful and therefore 
politically effective, but it does nothing to elucidate how the Internet should be 
regulated—if at all—to foster innovation and maximize consumer welfare. 
Most proponents of network neutrality regulation do not recognize that the 
dynamic nature of Internet innovation requires the simultaneous evolution of both 
content and network infrastructure. In defending network neutrality regulation as 
essential to the preservation of positive incentives among applications and content 
developers, advocates of network neutrality regulation have ignored the equal 
necessity of maintaining incentives to innovate among network operators. 
Advocates of network neutrality regulation frequently claim that, if regulation were 
not imposed, ISPs would suppress edge innovation by blocking content and 
applications.82 The extensive innovation that content and applications providers 
have achieved in the absence of network neutrality regulation is evidence that this 
argument is false. 
Supporters of network neutrality regulation have also manifested hostility to 
core innovation, promoting the belief that ISPs will curtail freedom of speech if 
permitted to manage network content.83 Although one incident has occurred since 
2007 that could have been construed as network-imposed censorship,84 it was 
singular. In the absence of network neutrality regulation, competitive network 
providers have not restricted content. The assertion that they would do so in the 
future, risking a decline in their customer base, is not persuasive. 
Despite the frequent invocation of First Amendment rights, the practical stakes 
of network neutrality have little to do with freedom of expression. As the Internet 
has evolved, it has accommodated applications and content for which the original 
architecture was not equipped. Active management, as well as investment at the 
core of the network, has always been necessary for the Internet to handle new 
 
81.  Evidence of this fact is obvious on sites like wearetheweb.org, savetheInternet.com, and 
freepress.net, which frame the debate over net neutrality as a fight for “freedom” against “discrimination.” 
SaveTheInternet.com, FreePress Presents: Save the Internet, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.savetheInternet.com/faq (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
82. See, e.g., FreePress Presents: Save the Internet, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.savetheInternet.com/faq (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (“The big phone and cable companies that 
control access to the Internet for most Americans want to get rid of Net Neutrality, the rule that prevents 
them from discriminating against online content. They want to become the Internet’s gatekeepers, deciding 
which sites go fast or slow and which won’t load at all—based on who pays them the most….If they get 
their way, the Internet as we know it—as a democratic platform for free speech and innovation—will 
disappear.”). 
83. See, e.g., FreePress.net, Save the Internet, http://www.freepress.net/savetheInternet (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2009) (“The stakes could not be higher. This is a political fight with consequences for everyone who 
uses the Internet for information, free expression, politics or business—or just to connect with others. Its 
outcome will decide not just who gets to have a voice in America’s democracy, but what that democracy 
looks like.”).  
84. Marguerite Reardon, AT&T Calls Censorship of Pearl Jam Lyrics a Mistake, CNET NEWS, 
Aug. 9, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9757841-7.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
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generations of content. The prioritization of certain data packets over others serves 
to increase network efficiency, resulting in better performance for all applications 
and enhanced consumer welfare. Too great a reliance on endpoint innovation to 
solve the problems created by increasing and more diverse network traffic would 
result in greater costs, reduced efficiency, and lower consumer welfare. 
 
III. THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK NEUTRALITY 
 
The nature of broadband networks has significant implications for how 
network neutrality regulation would affect innovation and consumer welfare. The 
broadband market is largely driven by innovation in a dynamically competitive 
setting. The two-sided demand for broadband delivery implies that services such as 
prioritized delivery—which would be prohibited under a network neutrality 
regime—provide Pareto improvements to consumer welfare. Together, demand for 
broadband, product differentiation, and technological progress foster competition 
among providers. A virtuous cycle continues as competition spurs further 
innovation. As the U.S. broadband market has demonstrated, consumers ultimately 
reap the benefits of lower prices and a widening variety of services. Network 
neutrality regulation would diminish the extent to which these benefits may be 
enjoyed. 
 
A.  Cost Characteristics of Broadband Networks 
 
Broadband networks require significant sunk investments. Private investors 
will continue to fund these investments only if they can expect to earn a reasonable 
return. Regulation can create uncertainty, raising the level of risk, and 
consequently increasing the return that investors will demand before choosing to 
invest. This increase in the cost of capital in turn reduces the magnitude of 
broadband investments. Additionally, because the incremental cost of adding a new 
subscriber to an existing network is low, marginal cost pricing is insufficient to 
recover a firm’s sunk costs. To recover its sunk investment with a usage-based fee, 
the firm, or its regulator, must set prices above the marginal cost, seeking as its 
goal the “optimal departures from marginal cost pricing” associated with Ramsey 
pricing and other inverse-elasticity pricing rules. Broadband network providers 
also exploit economies of scope to recoup the sunk costs of building broadband 
infrastructure.  
A significant source of value, which is often ignored by regulators, are the 
positive network effects that accumulate to a broadband network as it grows in size 
and diversity. In particular, the value of the network to each user increases with the 
size of the network. The benefit an individual consumer receives from using email 
increases with the number of other individuals whom he can contact, for example. 
Such effects accrue based on the amount of use, as well as the number of users. 
Regulators should therefore encourage policies that, all else being equal, increase 
the size of the network.  
In addition to these positive network effects, which are also common to 
telecommunications networks, broadband networks are subject to unique negative 
network effects. Network capacity is limited, and new applications, such as peer-
to-peer software and video streaming, increase demand for bandwidth. If users 
each pay the same (low) price for all levels of consumption, the demand for 
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broadband may exceed the network’s capacity, leading to congestion and slower 
transmission speeds. Proper price signals are needed so that those who consume 
the network’s capacity also bear the costs of generating it. 
 
B.  Two-Sided Demand for Broadband Delivery of Information 
 
The market for broadband service is multi-sided. Both content providers and 
end users benefit from, and thus have complementary demand for, use of the 
network. When a consumer uses broadband access to search on Google, the search 
is valued by both the user, who gains information, and by Google, which earns 
advertising revenues. Both sides of the market exhibit positive demand for 
broadband use, and both sides should therefore pay a positive price. The same 
principle applies to specific network features, such as priority delivery. If the 
quality of an application such as video conferencing would improve from priority 
delivery, both the user (who enjoys a superior broadband experience) and the 
application provider (who, as a result of the improved consumer experience, 
benefits from increased demand for its product) are willing to pay for this service. 
If, as a consequence of network neutrality regulation, only end-users are permitted 
to pay for priority delivery, then end-users will purchase only a limited quantity of 
prioritized packets. If the content provider is allowed to pay, then a higher quantity 
of prioritized packets will be purchased, which results in a larger consumer benefit. 
Additionally, allowing content providers to pay for service will help contribute to 
covering the sunk costs borne by service providers, thus increasing incentives to 
innovate and invest. 
Moreover, content providers are in a better position to pay for priority delivery 
than end-users. First, network operators can achieve lower transactions costs by 
contracting with content providers, rather than end-users, because there are 
significantly fewer content providers than end-users, and therefore fewer 
negotiations required. Second, end-users have high uncertainty regarding which 
applications they will use and which applications will require priority delivery. In 
contrast, network operators have a better understanding of whether the applications 
they offer require real-time delivery. Third, Ramsey pricing indicates that the price 
(more precisely, the markup above marginal cost) for products sharing common 
cost should be based on the inverse elasticity of demand. If content providers are 
less price-sensitive than end users, it is optimal to charge content providers a 
higher share of the common cost for priority delivery. There is no economic reason 
why end users should cover all the costs of the network when both parties benefit 
from its use. By charging content providers for prioritized delivery, a broadband 
service provider could recover sunk costs, reduce prices to consumers, and 
subsidize access to more price-sensitive customers, thereby increasing overall 
broadband penetration. 
Though proponents of network neutrality regulation often argue that broadband 
providers would limit or block access to innovative applications and content,85 this 
concern is unfounded. Broadband access and broadband content are 
complementary products. The demand for broadband and wireless access 
necessarily depends on demand for their uses. For example, email initially created 
demand for dial-up Internet access. Graphic-intensive applications, such as 
 
85.  See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, supra note 4, at 142; van 
Schewick, supra note 9, at 329; Lessig Testimony on Net Neutrality, supra note 3, at 7. 
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streaming video and gaming, generated the need for broadband. Consumers value 
choice, and, if a provider were to block competing content on its network, it would 
risk losing customers to providers that offered greater choice. Even in the unlikely 
circumstance that an integrated provider possessed market power such that it could 
block content without reducing its customer base, contract law and competition law 
may provide adequate ex post remedies for unlawful exercises of market power. It 
would be unwise to stifle the development of innovative content and applications 
ex ante, based solely on unwarranted concerns about blocking. The plain fact is 
that stifling demand for content would harm broadband providers just as greatly as 
it would content providers.  
In fact, it is more likely that broadband providers stimulate demand for 
applications and content. One example can be found in the wireless industry, where 
providers attract customers to their network by promoting the latest technology in 
wireless devices and the applications that run on them. Another example—voice 
over Internet protocol (VoIP) service—shows that application providers also have 
a strong incentive to create applications that provide substitutes for many of the 
existing services offered by network providers. Although these substitutes are not 
the original breakthrough applications, follow-on providers can capture revenue 
from network providers by finding lower cost methods to deliver similar services. 
Network providers in turn may determine that various considerations—for 
example, the threat to their revenues, network security concerns, and bandwidth 
constraints—justify an effort to suppress substitute services. However, network 
providers have largely concluded that the financial benefits of providing robust and 
open broadband services to customers have outweighed any incentive to block 
substitute services. Moreover, network operators have offered bundles of services 
at lower prices to retain existing revenue streams and to capture new, marginal 
customers. 
 
C. The Benefits of Product Differentiation 
 
Optional business-to-business transactions for QoS are fundamentally a form 
of product differentiation. Such transactions increase economic welfare because 
they increase choice. Moreover, such optional transactions for QoS will foster 
product differentiation on both the production and consumption sides of the market 
for content and applications, thereby increasing welfare both for consumers and for 
producers of content and applications. 
Consider first the producer side of the market. Enabling a supplier of content or 
applications to choose from a range of QoS tiers, based on the specific 
requirements of its product, enhances producer welfare. Increased producer welfare 
translates into increased investment and innovation in the production of content 
and in the development of applications. Enhanced innovation and investment result 
in increased diversity and quality of content and applications, enabling consumers 
to enjoy the benefits of product differentiation—which enhances consumer 
welfare. For those producers whose content depends on the quality of delivery—
such as producers of real-time video applications—QoS transactions help to ensure 
high product quality and continuing viability in the market. In contrast, a content 
provider whose product exhibits high tolerance for latency and jitter may choose to 
continue to rely upon cheaper best-effort delivery. 
Quality-of-service offerings also result in product differentiation for 
consumers—who should be the primary focus of this regulatory debate. Allowing 
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content and applications providers to contract for priority delivery ensures 
continued innovation in real-time and other QoS-dependent applications. 
Moreover, the fact that one content provider does not contract for priority delivery, 
and thereby “suffers” a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis some other content 
provider who opts for priority delivery, does not imply any reduction in consumer 
welfare. Indeed, consumers will be unequivocally better off as a result of greater 
choices in real-time applications on the Internet.86 
Even proponents of regulation concede that QoS tiers are beneficial forms of 
product differentiation. Chettiar and Holladay, for example, acknowledge that 
product differentiation is beneficial “because it allows buyers to choose among 
different options and it increases the chance of consumers finding a good that more 
accurately meets their needs.”87 Nonetheless, Chettiar and Holladay oppose 
optional business-to-business QoS transactions, evidently in the belief that some 
network operators might behave anticompetitively—perhaps, for example, by 
promising to deliver a certain level of service but then actually delivering a lower 
quality. However, these speculative fears cannot justify the overbroad prohibition 
embodied in the FCC’s proposed “nondiscrimination” rule. 
 
D.  Incentives for Innovation Within the Network and at Its Edges  
 
Notwithstanding claims to the contrary by proponents of network neutrality 
regulation,88 the broadband industry is a dynamic and competitive market, where 
consumers can choose among access substitutes. Consumers perceive cable modem 
service to be a close substitute to digital subscriber line (DSL) Internet access,89 
and both infrastructures are available on a near-ubiquitous basis in the United 
States. Other than in some rural areas, there are generally at least two forms of 
high-speed Internet available to a household or business, while other forms of 
high-speed Internet service exist as well.90 A third substitute is wireless access: 
wireless local area networks (WLAN) provide users with high-speed Internet 
connections at “hot spots,” such as Starbucks coffee shops, restaurants, hotels, 
universities, airports, and parks.91 In light of these competitive alternatives, there is 
no market failure that could justify regulation.  
Regulation that impedes the competitive process will in turn retard the 
development of new technology, applications, and content. Technical progress 
within the network supports innovation at the network’s edges, and vice versa. The 
positive network externalities associated with the Internet ensure that the benefits 
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“increasing concentration in broadband provision,” such that “an effective duopoly controls access to high 
speed Internet”). 
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of innovation at any point in the network redound to users at all levels—network 
operators, application providers, and customers alike. The converse of this virtuous 
cycle is also true—deterring innovation within the network through regulation will 
harm innovation at the edges, a fact that is largely ignored by the proponents of 
network neutrality regulation. Moreover, considering that customer satisfaction is 
likely to be enhanced through managed network services, the imposition of 
regulatory constraints would lower customer satisfaction and hamper the growth of 
consumer demand, which stimulates competition and innovation. 
Deregulation of broadband Internet access in the United States has led to 
substantial investment, higher broadband speeds, greater broadband deployment, 
lower pricing, and increased broadband usage by customers. Kagan Research 
estimated that the cable industry alone invested (U.S.) $14.6 billion in construction 
and upgrading expenditures in 2008.92 Broadband service is increasingly supplied 
by mobile wireless service providers.93 Mobile carriers have continued to grow 
rapidly and have expanded their wireless data offerings to include television-like 
services on wireless telephones.94 
Network operators have invested tens of billions of dollars in upgrades in fat 
and fast pipes, fiber, DOCSIS, and other recent network innovations that network 
operators have undertaken to improve QoS on their networks.95 The hundreds of 
billions of dollars invested in the past decade to improve Internet connection 
speeds96—which both opponents and advocates of network neutrality regulation 
recognize97—are powerful empirical evidence that there is no real threat of 
broadband operators purposely degrading the quality of their best-effort services. 
Advertising among network operators affirms that they compete largely on 
Internet delivery speeds and other service quality characteristics. Indeed, 
broadband providers’ advertising is heavily focused on the benefits they claim to 
offer in terms of speed and reliability. Network operators also frequently use 
comparative advertising to highlight the superiority of their service offerings over 
those of their competitors.98 For example, beginning in 2006, Comcast launched an 
advertising campaign in which two turtles are devoted to DSL, because they feel 
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have access to cable broadband service and industry capital investments of $161.2 billion since 1996). 
97. See, e.g., Google Comments, supra note 7, at n.120 (citing that AT&T has invested $38 billion 
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that “cable-modem service is just too fast.”99 More recently, Verizon and Comcast 
have engaged in an advertising battle that, on Verizon’s side, pits a smart, likeable 
FiOS installer against a dull and lazy cable installer.100 Comcast’s response was a 
campaign headed by the slogan, “Don’t fall for FiOS.”101 
Those advertising campaigns highlight the significant improvements that 
network operators have made and continue to make to their broadband service 
offerings. According to a survey released in February 2010, average broadband 
download speeds rose 28 percent in the United States in 2009 compared with 2008, 
with cable offering slightly less than 10 Mbps on average.102 As of February 2010, 
Verizon offered connection speeds via FiOS of 15, 25, and 50 Mbps,103 and AT&T 
offered connection speeds at 24Mbps. Cable companies too have invested in higher 
speeds. Even cable companies with core video businesses—those with the most 
incentive to relegate content to a hypothetical “dirt road”—have invested in 
improved best-effort delivery. Comcast has released its XFINITY offerings with 
Internet speeds of 50 to 100 Mbps.104 
The deregulation of broadband Internet access has also coincided with 
substantial innovation at the edges of the network. Facebook (launched in 2004), 
YouTube (launched in 2005), and Twitter (launched in 2006) are important 
examples of the significant investment in broadband-dependent applications over 
the last five years. Since Facebook became available to the general public in 
December 2008, over 15,000 websites, devices, and applications have implemented 
Facebook Connect.105 In 2006, Facebook launched its development platform, 
leading to the development of more than 350,000 applications currently active on 
Facebook Platform.106 In May 2009, Facebook reached a $10 billion valuation with 
Digital Sky Technologies’ $200 million investment in its preferred stock.107 In 
September 2009, Twitter reached a value of $1 billion.108 From its 2005 launch, 
YouTube surpassed 100 million U.S. viewers in March 2009.109 Despite the 
absence of codified network neutrality regulations, innovation at the edges of the 
network has continued to thrive from 2004 to the present. 
On wireless communications platforms, the number of applications available to 
wireless service customers—offered by handset manufacturers, wireless service 
providers, and third-party operators—has increased dramatically over the last 
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decade, notwithstanding the absence of legally binding and enforceable network 
neutrality rules. For example, Apple launched its application store in July 2008 
with 500 third-party applications available for download. By the end of May 2009, 
the Apple store offered more than 45,000 applications. As of March 2010, the app 
store included more than 150,000 applications.110 The Apple Store provides a 
model for market-based competition and innovation. Apple and AT&T provide 
developers with software development kits. AT&T also offers its AT&T Universal 
Design guidelines. Other resources that network operators have made available to 
developers include testing tools, white papers, reference information, best 
practices, technical information, and distribution tools.111 Considering the evidence 
of thriving innovation under the relatively unregulated state of affairs in broadband 
and wireless services, the assertion that network neutrality regulation is necessary 
to “preserve innovation at the edges of the network” does not withstand scrutiny. 
 
E. The Consumer-Welfare Effects of Network Neutrality Regulation  
 
Network neutrality regulation would harm consumers. In the absence of 
regulation, revenue from prioritized delivery could be used to subsidize broadband 
in households that would not otherwise purchase access. It is straightforward to 
estimate the savings to current broadband subscribers by multiplying the number of 
broadband households and the monthly savings in end-user broadband prices from 
the subsidy.112 In addition, marginal broadband households—that is, the last 
consumers to subscribe to broadband service at the current prices—also benefit by 
virtue of consuming a service that they could not previously afford or were not 
willing to purchase at the pre-subsidy price.113 By preventing network operators 
from subsidizing broadband access with revenues from content providers, network 
neutrality proponents would harm existing broadband subscribers by preventing a 
reduction in monthly prices, as well as marginal broadband subscribers, who forgo 
the service altogether in absence of subsidies.114 
A ban on vertical integration between network operators and content providers 
would also harm consumer welfare. Vertical integration reduces costs, the savings 
of which integrated firms pass along to the consumer. Moreover, because vertical 
integration intensifies competition among content providers, consumers also 
benefit from having a wider range of applications and content options. 
Because network capacity—particularly in wireless networks—is a scarce 
resource, active network management is necessary to preserve high quality of 
service. Bandwidth-intensive users downloading videos may reduce the quality of 
service for other users who are making voice calls.115 Managing the use of certain 
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bandwidth-heavy applications (streaming video or audio, webcam posts, automated 
data feeds, or VoIP) can help preserve a high quality of service on primary 
services—particularly, wireless voice calls.116 Management of network resources 
allows a greater number of consumers to be able to access scarce broadband 
resources while being assured of receiving an acceptable quality of service. 
Further, there is evidence that a significant number of consumers prefer a user 
experience that is more actively managed, for reasons such as ease of use and 
quality of service. A notable example of this trend is the iPhone; another is 
Amazon’s Kindle, for which customers purchase the device and downloads, but do 
not pay for wireless network usage (provided by Sprint). In return, customers must 
agree not to use the Kindle for anything other than its intended purpose.117 A 2006 
customer satisfaction survey by J.D. Powers118 ironically ranked many of the 
carriers who engaged in practices challenged by network neutrality advocates119 as 
providing the highest call quality, which could be attributed to more vigorous 
policing of network activity. 
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The FCC’s proposed rulemaking to codify six principles of network neutrality 
could have profound economic consequences for consumers, content and 
applications providers, and network operators. Network management services are 
increasingly in demand as bandwidth-intensive applications and content are 
produced and as more data are transported over lower-capacity wireless platforms. 
Network neutrality regulation would prohibit optional business-to-business 
transactions for prioritized delivery services between network operators and 
content and applications providers. This restriction would discourage innovation 
and product differentiation in content and applications, and it would impose further 
costs on end users by precluding subsidization of broadband access through 
ancillary revenue streams, such as advertising. 
Proponents of network neutrality regulation have ignored the adverse 
incentives that network neutrality regulation would impose on network operators 
and content and applications providers. They have arbitrarily designated the value 
of innovation in content and applications as greater than the value of innovation at 
the core of the network, not recognizing that innovation must occur in both sectors 
to maximize consumer welfare. Proponents of network neutrality regulation have 
also failed to account for the adverse effects that a reduction in core investment 
would have on innovation in content and applications. Most popular arguments 
supporting network neutrality regulation as necessary for the protection of 
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consumer freedom are political in nature and lack proper grounding in economic 
principles and the technical facts of network optimization. 
A regime of network neutrality regulation would harm innovation at both the 
core and the edges of the network. Consumer welfare would suffer in the short 
term as a result of increased delays and higher end-user costs. In the longer term, 
network neutrality regulation would reduce incentives among service providers to 
invest in network infrastructure, thereby reducing consumer welfare.  
 
